It was reported yesterday by the New York Times that Israel had attacked the Iranian “spy ship” cargo vessel SAVIZ took a hit after being planted with a limpet mine. It is unclear whether the limpet mine was planted below or above the hull’s waterline. “The explosion occurred on Tuesday morning near the Djibouti coast and caused minor damage with no casualties. The vessel was a civilian ship stationed there to secure the region against pirates,” ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh said. As we see it, the problem with that statement is that the international navies combatting piracy are more focused on the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa as opposed to the southern section of the Red Sea. The vessel has been drifting there since January 2017 after departing the ISOICO dry dock west of Bandar Abbas on November 20th, 2016.
The consensus narrative within the maritime intelligence community (along with Iranian officials who got in touch with us privately) is that the vessel is rotating members of the IRGC (Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) that arrive from Iran’s Gulf of Oman port of Jask. We have also seen speedboats approach tankers on their way out of Iran towards either Syria or Venezuela as they head up the Red Sea towards the Suez Canal. Each and every time, a tanker would stop by the SAVIZ for (most usually) a day or two and continue towards the canal; and vice versa when heading back to Iran. It certainly implies that a crew rotation is likely as Iran does not use air transport to reach the vessel, but entirely by sea.
Satellite photo shows one of the moments a tanker heading for Venezuela was approached by a (likely an IRGC) speedboat from Jask before the tanker continued to the Red Sea.
Given that Iran’s fleet of tankers in particular has “immunity” from US interception due to the promise of a retaliatory response against US interests and partners in the region, they tend to move around with their AIS switched off until they detect any possible threats. This seems very counterintuitive given that most mariners around the world understand that in event of a looming piracy threat that they should instead switch off their AIS transponders. The reason for this is because Iran wants to be able to prove in front of the international community that these merchant vessels are only moving cargo from point A to B and nothing else. Any erratic GPS traces in the AIS data would imply a scuffle that would need further looking into.
According to an anonymous Iranian official who got in touch with us (with fresh data we were able to corroborate), the tankers that pass by Jask pick up not only IRGC staff, but also light weapons and UAV/drone components for assembly in Yemen by Houthi rebels. Whether or not that is true is yet to be seen, but it certainly makes sense given that these tankers pass by the SAVIZ several times a month while she acts as an outpost in the international waters between northwestern Yemen and Eritrea. The SAVIZ has kept her AIS transponder on for most of the time she has been nested there for the past 4 years for the same reason why Iranian tankers switch on their transponders on in the Red Sea; because of a constant looming threat.
Recent satellite photo shows multiple Syria-bound tankers stopping by the SAVIZ before continuing journey.
Although Saudi Arabia would happily love to see the SAVIZ vacate the area in order to cut down on supply to the Houthis while also making sure that its own navy isn’t being eavesdropped on by advanced radio equipment, they do not wish to be blamed for any incidents on Iranian vessels in the Red Sea. When we look back at recent history over the past two years, everything suggests that Saudi Arabia has played the role of bystander when it comes to maritime incidents involving Iranian vessels. For example, a couple of NITC (National Iranian Tanker Company) tankers “broke down” while sailing north towards the Suez Canal (for Syria) and were assisted by Saudi tugboats as well as even repaired in the anchorage of Jeddah, such as with the HAPPINESS I.
Iran understood that Saudi Arabia isn’t behind any of these attacks because Saudi Arabia fears having any of its tankers and oilfields come under fire by Iran and its proxies, so instead, the Iranians actually thanked Saudi Arabia for their assistance. There was even a case involving an injury aboard the SAVIZ where Saudi Arabia airlifted an Iranian crewmember for treatment. As fellow OPEC member states, these two countries know what’s important, and that is the maintained flow of oil. Saudi Arabia wants to exude to clients that it is a reliable source of supply given that it exports the most, whereas Iran, under pressure of sanctions, is resorting to chaotic tactics in hopes to remind the international community that regional supply only happens because they regard themselves as the gatekeepers of the Strait of Hormuz. This is why we see tankers being pulled aside, captured or damaged by limpet mines; which now bring us to what happened in May and June of 2019.
On May 12th, 2019 a “tanker tussle” broke out in the anchorage of Furjairah, UAE, where four foreign vessels were attacked by limpet mines placed above their waterlines. This coordinated attack happened less than two weeks after US sanctions went into full effect after the six-months long oil waiver period following the sanctions announcement in early May 2018. A similar series of attacks then took place a month later further out in the Gulf of Oman near the port of Jask. In what we regard to be a retaliatory response (most likely by Israel), the SBM (Single Buoy Mooring) pipelines off the coast of Baniyas, Syria were blown up by divers in July 2019. This caused a setback to Iran’s ability to deliver crude oil on time, and Syria had to pool together additional vessels to host as floating storages for inbound Iranian tankers so that they don’t have to wait too long and can sail back to Iran to fetch more oil.
.png)
Following that May 2019 tanker tussle off of Fujairah, we discovered a couple of months later a vessel of interest called BETA. She is an Aframax tanker that was anchored in the Gulf of Oman since 2017 and empty of cargo during that period. According to the IMO (International Maritime Organization), the vessel’s owner is based in the UAE, but she quietly appeared in Iran’s navy port of Shahid Bahonar in early August 2019. What’s more interesting is that the vessel actually departed the scene of the attacks in the Gulf of Oman only a couple of days later on May 14th for the anchorage of Jask, Iran. And to make things even more interesting, BETA’s sister-ship (same owner) called CITY ELITE, was in her midst as well in the Gulf of Oman up until November 2018. Both tankers have a very dodgy AIS history (with waypoints at random locations worldwide), and she too is now missing. We haven’t found her since that last sighting in November 2018. That vessel completely disappeared and is not reported to be missing or scrapped.
Aframax tanker BETA berthed at Iranian navy port of Shahid Bahonar during 2019 and 2020. Photograph was contributed to TankerTrackers.com
At the end of August 2020, the BETA was then relocated from Shahid Bahonar to the ISOICO dry dock area, where she spent the following three months undergoing a complete transformation to become what’s referred to as a “floating forward base”; a navy vessel called I.R.I.S.N. MAKRAN. She now sports a large helipad and can accommodate several helicopters. The vessel’s new maiden voyage was to the anchorage of Chabahar on January 13th, 2021 where she took part in the Iran-Russia naval exercises as part of a PR propaganda exercise. After that, the MAKRAN sailed right back to ISOICO so that she could be outfitted with helicopter hangars they didn’t get around to installing during Q4 2020. As of writing, the MAKRAN is still at ISOICO and we have seen some changes on the deck since.
Based on all the data and eye-witness visual media we have been provided, we believe that prior to becoming the MAKRAN, the BETA may likely have been the makeshift floating forward base in the assault on the tankers in the Gulf of Oman on May 12th, 2019. This merchant vessel was resting inconspicuously out in plain sight amongst other merchant vessels and empty of any oil cargo for two years. It was the perfect camouflage. She also had a helipad which meant that troops could arrive by air at any time, and was situated in international waters off the coast of UAE. From there, attacks were likely launched. It would have been extremely unlikely for the IRGC to show up in official government speedboats in the anchorage of Fujairah or with a submersible given the high density of vessels. While the world press was covering the six tankers that were attacked in May and June of 2019, not one news organization issued a story about the sudden disappearance of a UAE-owned merchant tanker in Iran, simply because the owner never reported her missing.
UPDATE: According to unverified photographs posted today on Iran’s Nournews, we see an IMO number belonging to the SAVIZ inside the engine room. It is flooded with water, meaning that the limpet mine was placed beneath the waterline.
UPDATE 2021-04-14: As maritime tensions quickly escalate in the Middle East between Iran and Israel, we see that Iran has now dispatched a frigate to protect its ‘spy ship’ SAVIZ, located in the southern section of the Red Sea. SAVIZ was purportedly attacked. A SkySat satellite image by Planet Labs. 15.88518° N, 41.10038° E
– END OF REPORT –